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Pakistan journal article 
 
Social Network Analysis of Terrorist Networks: Can it add value? 
 
What is the value of social network analysis (SNA) to the study of terrorism? The study of 
terrorism has increased since the attacks of September 11, 2001. This time period has coincided 
with the increase in personal computer processing power allowing desktop operation of network 
analysis programs enabling academic researchers to use SNA mechanisms to study social 
networks. This is still a relatively young field of study, particularly in the terrorist arena. 
Nonetheless, the authors suggest that it will add a valuable realm of data to help understand how 
terrorist groups operate and can be combated.   
 
Terrorism occurs through highly visible acts. Yet the operation of the terror networks is largely 
invisible, hidden within an opaque and loose structure of individuals and groups. This invisibility 
shields the internal operation and functioning of the networks from scrutiny and limits 
understandings of how to either engage with members to negotiate mutual outcomes, or disrupt, 
dismantle or destroy these entities.  This article is not about the detailed intelligence work 
conducted by intelligence agencies. Rather it asks the question of what academics can learn 
about the nature of terrorist networks through SNA techniques. 
 
The nature of terrorist groups 
Human society operates in networks of work, private relationships and broader social interaction. 
Most of these networks are mundane and open to the world. However, there are a category of 2 
 
networks that are hidden from view. These dark networks are those where the network 
achievements come at the cost of other individuals, groups or societies and, in addition, their 
activities are both ‘covert and illegal’ (Raab and Milward, 2003). Terrorist groups fall within this 
category. 
 
A distinction must be drawn at this point between the two types of dark networks. An organised 
crime network wants to remain invisible to all but their customers. They operate without the 
scrutiny of law enforcement. Terror networks, on the other hand, must have some level of 
visibility to achieve their goals. A terror group uses terror (fear and violence) attacks to draw 
attention to their political goal. These attacks are necessarily public and the group must claim 
responsibility to draw the nexus between the attack and their campaign. Even as acts of extortion 
(meet our demands or we will attack again), a terror group must identify their existence and their 
goal as a necessary part of the extortion technique. This does not mean that the group is entirely 
visible. It must keep its membership, location, organisation and finances outside the public gaze. 
Nonetheless sufficient study has taken place on terrorist groups to distinguish their unique 
characteristics which can inform SNA study. 
 
Terrorist networks, from SinnFein to Al Quaeda, have proven to be resilient entities; resisting 
persistent and focused attempts to dismantle. Gupta (2008) has identified three potential areas of 
vulnerability related to their membership. First, terrorist groups rely upon charismatic leaders to 
succeed (Gupta, 2008). However, leaders can also be a point of vulnerability. Politically, 
"Through their vision these innovators 'connect the dots' for their followers, which not only 
suddenly allow them to see who they are in terms of a larger entity, but also a way out of their 3 
 
current predicament." (Gupta, 2008) People have a proclivity to follow leaders but the leaders 
need the skills to motivate to become successful leaders. Gupta states that leaders do this by 
creating a group identity: framing issues in a manner that accentuates this identity through 
anxiety based on difference. Through this process other groups are scape-goated with the blame 
for all the perceived wrongs suffered by the group members and an ideal is promulgated that will 
right these wrongs (Gupta, 2008). Without a strong organizational structure and engrained 
operating framework, leaders and other core roles within networks, such as commanders (those 
that direct operations) and brokers (those that connect the groups with cells and supporters), are 
essential elements directing the work of the networks. Without these roles the terrorist network 
lacks the institutional capacity to survive. However, within networks leadership is dispersed, 
with multiple people taking on various leadership roles. This makes the location of key leaders 
and other central roles difficult.   
 
Second, terror groups are supported by a particular nature of membership. There are three types 
of member motivations:  
  Mercenaries (greed) are those who participate solely for personal gain.  
  Ideologues (ideology) are those who participate primarily out of desire to help the group.  
  Captive participants (fear) are those who participate because the cost of not participating 
is too high  (Gupta, 2008).  
If there is no money then the mercenaries will leave. If there is no leader then the ideological 
base of the group may dissipate. Finally, if the mercenaries and ideologues are gone then the 
captive participants will be free to cease involvement in the terror network. Thus, the 4 
 
identification and location of funding streams and funding connectors has the potential to starve 
the network of the resources needed to sustain a mercenary workforce.  
 
Third, public support is essential as a source of volunteers, money, safe houses and protection 
against infiltration by the government. A network gets stronger when its base grows. When a 
group gets large enough it can recruit captive participants. When it loses its legitimacy and core 
memberships it gets depleted (Gupta, 2008). Thus groups survive through tapping into existing 
networks such as religious groups and unions and financing, through crime, other governments 
and tithes from supporters (Gupta, 2008). Conversely, terror groups die off when either: their 
political goals become irrelevant; through loss of leadership by embarrassment through military 
defeat, the leader being killed or imprisoned, or if the leader changes sides; or, the group 
achieves its goals (Gupta, 2008). Assuming anti-terrorist organizations do not want the latter, and 
that they are not in a position to change broader politics, then they need to pursue a policy of 
cutting off the terrorist group from their base, their finance or their leader. Each of these three 
potential areas of vulnerability can be better facilitated and enacted by studying the network of a 
terrorist group.  
 
Social network analysis (SNA) 
Network analysis is an empirical tool which can be used to identify, measure, visualize and 
analyze the ties between people, groups and organizations (Scott, 1991). It plots relationships 
between individuals or entities by representing them as nodes and showing their relationships by 
linking nodes with lines. Lines can have different depictions to indicate characteristics of links 
including frequency and method of contact. The nodes and lines form a network map that reveals 5 
 
relationships between members of the network such as gate keeping (controlling the network), 
liaisons and core and periphery members’ (Sparrow, 1991). In so doing, it uncovers the often 
hidden or opaque patterns of interaction and enables the underlying structure of relationships to 
become more apparent (Cross et al., 2002).  The graphical or mapping visualization capacity 
affords administrators and others charged with the responsibility for ‘responding to terrorism’ to 
more clearly and empirically examine the network topography, diagnose weak points and 
propose areas for intervention.  
 
In addition to its visual contribution, the mathematical underpinnings of network analysis also 
generate network metrics that make it possible to gain deeper insights into the actual texture and 
operation of the networks. Social network analysis can be used to examine a network’s resilience 
by analyzing vulnerability through identifying central nodes, the availability of alternate nodes to 
take the place of lost central nodes, and less-central but bridging nodes tying together remote 
sections of the network (Keast and Brown, 2005). Measures such as density (the level of 
connectivity) and centrality (the level of concentration) also provide important insights into the 
structural properties of dark networks.  
 
Density is a measure of the number of actual connections compared to the total number of 
possible connections. Centrality measures how concentrated a network is; high concentration 
indicates that a small number of people control the flow of resources. Average Path Distance is 
an indication of how quick it is to navigate around the network. This measure provides insights 
into how close or removed certain actors are and, as a consequence, their level of knowledge.   
Closeness is a measure of the proximity that an actor has to all other actors in the network, and is 6 
 
related to the flow of information within a network.  Betweenness determines the shortest path 
distance between every pair of actors in a network, and then measures the degree to which an 
actor appears on those paths.  Actors that control information within a network will have much 
higher betweenness values than those who appear on the fringes.   
 
The study of the social network basis of covert networks precedes the modern visualization 
revolution by decades. Erickson (1981) noted that covert networks must be studied using these 
techniques. Similarly Baker and Faulkner (1993) examined the nature of white collar crime 
networks and drew conclusions about the nature of how such a network must operate. A RAND 
study by Arquilla and Ronfeldt (2001), Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and 
Militancy, placed more emphasis on the organizational rather than social nature of the network.  
 
SNA has already had extensive use in the analysis of organized crime groups. Since the 1930s, 
research into criminal interaction identified the significance of network structures in facilitating 
criminal activity (Sutherland, 1937). From the 1970s, studies into Italian-American and Sicilian 
organised crime families suggested that these groups were based upon social or familial 
networks, kinship ties and shared cultural values within a community (Albini, 1971, Ianni, 1972). 
The use of SNA as a method to analyse organised crime groups is well-motivated given that 
numerous scholars have argued that organised crime is, at a fundamental level, a product of 
overlapping and interrelated social relationships (Heber, 2009, Kleemans and de Poot, 2008, 
Bruinsma and Bernasco, 2004, McIllwain, 1999, Block, 1994).  
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Networks are seen as a more suitable structure for organised crime because they facilitate the 
flow of information, can adapt to changes in law enforcement responses and have the flexibility 
to deal with the associated risks inherent in all organised crime activities. Within an organised 
crime network, SNA techniques can identify network members that control information and how 
the removal of one or more members can inhibit the flow of information or alter the network’s 
ability to adapt or perform at its best (Carley et al., 2002). This type of analysis is essential in 
destabilizing networks (Carley et al., 2002). Thus, the utility of SNA as an analytical framework 
is apparent given evidence that the structure of organised crime groups are shifting towards more 
flexible networks (von Lampe, 2009) and that the nature of information provided by SNA can 
potentially disrupt organised crime activity. 
 
SNA and terror networks 
One of the most important developments in the SNA field in the last decade has been the 
development of reliable visualization software packages that can be used on a desktop or laptop 
computer. The processing power of computers has made sophisticated data analysis a routine 
activity that can be performed with basic instruction in the packages software. It is no longer 
necessary for a researcher to have mastered the mathematics of SNA metrics. Most software 
packages like Analyst Notebook include the ability to produce SNA analytics literally with the 
'click of a button'. It can, therefore, be expected that there will be a proportional growth in the 
use of these abilities as the price and power of SNA software increases. Visualization of a 
network provides a unique ability to study a network. Yang et al (2006) note that visualization of 
terror networks can reveal the subgroups within the network, the key players and how the 
members interact. Xu and Chen (2005) also noted the significance of visualization and using 8 
 
SNA. However, neither of these studies uses the full potential of SNA metrics to study the nature 
of the groups and draw testable hypotheses for the study of terrorist networks generally.  
 
The published studies of terrorist groups are far less extensive than those of organized crime. 
This may be a result of the relative inaccessibility of data. However, the publicity attached to 
terrorism is much greater than that for organized crime and this has allowed some researchers to 
construct their own datasets of terror networks. This occurs in two ways. First, detailed media 
coverage of terror group activities can be sufficient to build a network map. For example, Krebs 
(2002) was able to map the 9/11 terror network through media reports in the New York Times, 
the Wall Street Journal, the Washington Post and the Los Angeles Times. There are also 
increasingly detailed studies from independent research agencies such as RAND and especially 
the International Crisis Group, which can provide both intricate detail and high levels of 
reliability,  
 
The arrival of accessible SNA software packages has led to a number of articles being published 
analyzing terrorist networks. Koschade (2006) studied Jemaah Islamiyah using SNA techniques 
to make significant findings about the strengths and weaknesses of the group. Mullins and 
Dolnik (2009) studied other Islamic terrorist groups. Memon et al (2008) found small world 
characteristics in terror networks. Many more studies are necessary before any reliable 
empirically based theories of terror networking can be developed.  
 
Resilience of Networks 9 
 
One of the most valuable contributions that academic study of terror networks can provide is an 
understanding of what makes a terror network resilient. The study of resilience is valuable in 
determining how to destabilize or break up a network. Reducing resilience increases 
vulnerability (Ayling, 2009). Studies of resilience should do more than just describe 
vulnerabilities such as central nodes or personalities. The removal of key personnel, such as the 
most central node, will not necessarily collapse the network (Milward and Raab, 2006). Resilient 
networks are flexible and adapt to survive. The adaption may take many forms from replacement 
of lost individuals through to a major reorganization of the network. The points of resilience are 
the characteristics that allow the network to avoid or recover from an attack. Thus we should be 
wary on conclusions about network vulnerability that assume the relationships within the 
network are static and do not account for adaptation. This does not mean that we should not 
attack a network by undermining its strength, but rather that we should avoid naïve assumptions 
as to what constitutes strength. 
 
Long lasting networks are the most dangerous. Not only will they produce the largest quantity of 
attacks over their extended life, but they will have the longest time to learn from their mistakes, 
become terror veterans, and could be expected to produce the most effective attacks. Resilience 
is the capacity to survive environmental change and direct attack. Bakker et al (2011) proposed 
that resilience is ‘dynamic’ and networks should not be considered as fixed entities. When 
studying resilience researchers should also consider the nature of the external forces at work, the 
ability of a network to withstand these pressures (robustness), the ability to bounce back from 10 
 
attack (rebound) and their vulnerability to attacks by an ‘informed actor’, that is someone who 
knows the network.  
 
Most of the SNA work on resilience has been conducted on organized crime groups. In the case 
of such a group it refers to the ability of that group to continue its operations through a changing 
market and the direct interference of both competitors and policing agencies. Bouchard used 
environmental studies of resilience to develop a list of characteristics which are useful in 
determining network resilience: vulnerability referred to the likelihood of damage from a specific 
type of attack; elasticity is the system’s ability to return to its original state after taking damage; 
and the network’s adaptive capacity is its ability to change to reduce its vulnerability (Bouchard, 
2007). The most common adaption by dark networks is to reduce their visibility either through 
reduced size or looser structures (Bouchard, 2007). Dark networks suffer unique vulnerabilities, 
namely, visibility attracts unwanted attention, especially from law enforcement. Visibility may 
not be a weakness in itself but it increases that likelihood of investigation. Visibility can occur in 
two ways: a large, formal network will be more visible to outsiders than a small, loose network; 
and, a central node (a person with many connections in the network) will be more visible than a 
node with less centrality because he will be associated with a greater range of activity. Not all 
networks have a centre of gravity, or core, which retains authority over the periphery of the 
network and directs its operations (Klerks, 2001, Morselli et al., 2007).  
 
Milward and Raab (2006) point out that a dark network must follow certain steps to establish the 
network. First, they must find enough people for the network; a task usually met by finding 11 
 
members in the same proximal group. Erickson (1981) concluded that risk can only be controlled 
by relying on trusted members and through the use of a strict hierarchical operational structure. 
Milward and Raab (2006) identified three alternative criteria of resilience. First the members 
needed to have character traits that supported the network. Second, the members had to be able 
to trust each other. Third the network is more resilient if it has connectivity robustness, the ability 
to respond and recover from losses of critical nodes. 
 
We have already noted that hierarchies are avoided to offset the risks of visibility. However, trust 
sets the boundaries of dark networks. A dark network must limit its membership to those it can 
trust, i.e. it must be a closed network, made up of people with strong relationships (Burt, 2005). 
Members of the closed network share information about the reputation of other members. A 
member’s reputation is determined by expectations of the person’s future performance based on 
his or her past performance within the group; repeated good performance builds an expectation 
of future good performance. According to Burt, "You trust someone when you commit to a 
relationship before you know how the other person will behave." (Burt, 2005) A good reputation 
is built by emulating behavior that reflects the group’s norms; norms which are built up over the 
social history of the group. Thus a terrorist group’s members have a reputation that rates their 
commitment to the ideology and their trust worthiness to both maintain secrecy and reliably 
fulfill tasks. If a member of the group does not know a potential working partner they can obtain 




Krebs (2002) mapped the terror cell responsible for the 9/11 attacks. He reached some 
conclusions about covert networks. Once in a conspiratorial network like a terror cell, the 
members rely on strong ties. They cannot afford to make new acquaintances outside the network. 
Krebs said that the terrorists formed strong ties in the past, for example, through school, and had 
such ties with all the members of the group. They do not expose these ties lest they reveal their 
network. The ties also allowed for redundancy; though he does not explain how. Krebs also says 
the same ties made the network strong and resilient, but once again did not explain how.  
 
Williams presented two mechanisms by which networks protect themselves (Williams, 2001 ). 
Some networks defend themselves by developing buffer nodes at the periphery to protect the 
core from police investigation. The peripheral members undertake the high profile activity while 
the core members would keep such activity at arm’s length to ensure deniability of any criminal 
action and to reduce their visibility to observers outside the network (Williams, 2001 ). Second, a 
network could be compartmentalized so that the loss of one compartment would not bring down 
the entire network (Lauchs et al., 2011b, Lauchs et al., 2011a). Both the structures can be 
revealed through visualization and SNA. But there are nuances that must be recognized, for 
example, having a network core does not mean that this is the locality of the network leadership. 
Carley, Lee and Krackhardt (2002) demonstrate that the leaders may not have the most contacts 
in the network; a leader may only communicate with one lieutenant who then interacts with 
agents and allies. In such a group the leader is protected by the more central decoy should law 
enforcement make assumptions about targeting group members based on centrality. Removal of 
a central node or a broker would still inhibit the network’s operation. Removing one node may 13 
 
not destroy the network if that node can be replaced by a new emergent leader to embody the 
leadership role or fill the network space (Carley et al., 2002). SNA can locate the true points of 
vulnerability in the network rather than simply the apparent leadership. It can also provide a clear 
picture of how information flows in the network. 
 
Carley, Lee and Krackhardt (Carley et al., 2002) note that network destabilization can occur 
through a reduction in the rate of information flow in the network, a failure/destruction or 
significant slowing down of the decision making process, or a reduction in operational 
effectiveness  – the ability to conduct its tasks. Latora and Marchiori (2004) point out that 
network efficiency measures how well communication flows in the network. They propose 
measuring the network efficiency of a group and attacking the nodes whose removal will bring 
about the greatest reduction in efficiency, noting that, the best node to attack is not always that 
which has the most connections. Once again, these flaws can be mapped in the visualization 
software and analysed via SNA metrics. 
 
Conclusion 
The increase in personal computer power has made it possible for academics to map and analyse 
complex networks such as terrorist groups. Due to the recent advent of this area of study there 
have been few published studies of terror networks using SNA and visualization. SNA offers an 
extremely useful tool for understanding how terror groups form and operate. In particular, it 
allows the ‘hidden’ or opaque structure and relations of the networks to become more visible 
and, therefore, open to intervention. We suggest that the most important area to study is 
resilience of the groups, as long lasting groups are the most dangerous to the community. 14 
 
 
SNA helps attack the resilience of groups by identifying membership links, money movements 
and information flows within a network. The metrics analyse the strengths and weaknesses of a 
network and allow targeting of the individuals whose removal will most effectively disrupt the 
terror group’s operations. While academics are unlikely to be studying real-time information in 
the same manner as intelligence agencies, they can still develop theories about terrorist group 
structures and operations which will help everyone better understand the groups vulnerabilities 
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